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OPTIMIZATION ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION: 
A GOODNESS-OF-FIT APPROACH 
by Bahram Adrangi* and Kambiz Raffiee** 
Abstract 
ThIS paper exammes the hypothesIs of optlmlzmg behavIOr of the U S. consumers usmg 
quarterly and seasonally adjusted senes on real consumer expenditures on eIght commodIty 
groups. clothIng, durable goods, energy, food, hOUSIng, medIcal care, transportatIon, and other~ 
for the perIod of 1947 I through 1993 I. FolloWIng the Weak AXIom of Revealed Preference 
(W ARP), a money-metnc utIlIty functIon is derIved to calculate an effIcIency mdex to 
determme the percentage dIfference between the obscl ved cost of consumptIon and the optImum 
cost of consumption m each penod of the sample The empmcal resulb provide eVidence that 
the allocativc effiCIency 111 the U S ha~ improved only slIghtly due to the wave of deregulatlom 
m the early 1980s. Our results are COTI5lstent with the predIctIOns of the general theory of second 
best m showmg that gams In the allocattve effiCiency may be mll1lmal a~ long as many sectors 
of the economy remam partially or totally regulated 
I. Introduction 
The U.S economy has undergone a dramatIc 
transformatIOn from consisting of a large 
number of small flrms during the 18th and 19th 
centuries to being increasingly dominated by 
giant corporations in the 20th century. The 
growth of big bus mess led to concentration of 
economIc power III the hands of few firms while 
increaSIng productIvity and standard of hving. 
Increasing corporate power precipItated the 
government regulation of industries [peltz man , 
1977]. For example, most trucking, raIlroad 
rates and routes, and waterway shipping were 
regulated under the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission established in 1887. Despite some 
successes, the outcomes of government regula-
tory efforts have been mixed at best In many 
cases a clear economic case for regulation, I.e., 
a lack of well-defined property rights, deficient 
InformatIOn In the market, and existence of 
natural monopolies, does not eXIst. Therefore, 
in the last few decades government policies 
toward business have attracted interest among 
politICIans, economIsts, and the public at large. 
The discussions have often centered on the issue 
of competition In the market place and ways to 
enhance the degree of competition in the 
economy The consensus among policy makers 
and economists alike seems to be that more 
competItIOn in the market place may improve 
productive and allocative effIciencIes In the 
economy. 
These discussIOns and concerns resulted In the 
partIal or total deregulatIOn of industries such as 
aIrlines, bankIng, and trucking III the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. Even partial deregulatIOn of 
any sector IS lauded by economIst'> as a means of 
improvement 1Il allocative and productive effI-
ciencies. However. the general theory of second 
best maIntains that the benefits of piece-meal 
policie'> of deregulatIOn may be overstated. 
AccordIng to this theory, as long as regulatory 
constraInts are imposed on some sectors of the 
economy, even the restoration of pareto optimal-
Ity condItions In other sectors may not produce 
the desired optimum productive and allocatJve 
efficiencies [Peltzman, 1976; Schmalensee, 
1979; StIgler, 1971; Weiss; 1981]. 
Many researchers, particularly in the past two 
decades, have measured or analyzed economic 
effICIency in the newly deregulated industries. 
For example, Adrangl et a1. [1995], Moore 
[1986], Winston et al. [1990], Daughty and 
Nelson [1988], and Ylllg [1990a, 1990b], 
among others, study the deregulatIOn of the U. S. 
trucking Illdustry and Its effects on the produc-
tIvity and technical efficiency of the trucking 
Illdu:,try. Almost all of these studies conclude 
that the deregulatIOn of thIS industry resulted III 
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rate reductions and improvements in technical 
efficiency. WInston et al. (1990) find that 
shippers and ultimately consumers and the 
society benefited from the deregulation of the 
trucking industry by approximately $11 billion 
(in 1977 dollars) annually. 
Other researchers, Bailey et al. [1985], Bailey 
and Williams [1988], Borenstein [1989, 1990], 
Graham et al. [1983], and Morrison and 
Winston [1993]. among others, show that the 
deregulation and structural transition in the U. S. 
airline industry have drastically improved airline 
efficiency and reduced air fares. 
Similarly, the last two decades have witnessed 
a serious increase in crittcal scrutiny of publIc 
policy toward the banking industry. Longstand-
ing restrictions on various aspects of the industry 
due to regulation. e.g, limits on pricing, on 
asset management, and on geographic expan-
sion, have been reduced or eliminated in recent 
years. Deregulation has also changed conditions 
of entry, type of products that financial 
intermediaries may legally offer, and degree of 
competition in banking markets. The conditions 
of stability, efficiency, and resource allocations 
of the banking industry are all improved under 
deregulatIOn [Gilbert, 1984; Kane. 1981; Rose, 
1987]. 
Despite the aforementioned moves in the U.S. 
economy toward a "freer market" with less 
regulations and controls by the government, 
government agencies such as Federal Aviation 
Agency (FAA), Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC), and Federal CommunicatIOns Com-
mission (FCC) still regulate diverse sectors of 
the economy such as trucking, banking, airlines, 
railr<flt1is, barges, pipelines, and telecommunica-
tiont.VComplete deregulation of the economy 
may never occur, perhaps due to externalities, 
pubhc goods, and natural monopolies. Restric-
tive regulation in the absence of "market 
failure" may also stem from a lack of concrete 
evidence that increased competition In the 
economy leads to enhanced allocative and 
productive efficiencies. 
The past research on economic gains from 
competitive markets and reduced deregulation 
has focused on the supply-side of the economy 
and gains in technical and productive efficien-
cies. In contrast to the supply-side issues and 
technical effiCiency, the demand-side of the 
market has received very little attention. The 
Vol. 41, No.2 (Fall 1997) 
question of whether consumers are maximizing 
utility subject to budget constraint, i.e., exact 
optimizing behavior, is assumed but generally 
not critically tested and evaluated in the 
academic literature. This issue is important 
because efficiency on the production and 
supply-side is not sufficient to guarantee the 
efficiency in the entire economy unless the 
consumer behavior also satisfies the conditions 
of utility maximizatIOn under constraint. 
The examination of consumer behavior is not 
unrelated to the deregulation of various sectors 
of the economy. The deregulation provides 
consumers an opportunity to benefit from 
choices that the competitive market offers. Do 
consumers actually take advantage of the freer 
market and strive to allocate their resources most 
efficiently as professed by the neoclassical 
theory of consumer behavior? If on the demand-
side consumers are not allocating their scarce 
resources in accordance with the utility maximi-
zation paradigm, then the economy may not 
achieve maximum efficiency despite gains in 
productive efficiency. 
This paper presents new empincal evidence 
on the nature of optimizing behavior of the U.S. 
consumers using quarterly and seasonally ad-
justed series in 1987 dollars, taken from the 
Citibase, on real consumer expenditures on eight 
commodity categories: clothing, durable goods, 
energy, food, housing, medical care, transporta-
tion, and others for the period of 1947:1 through 
1993:1. Following the Weak Axiom of Revealed 
Preference (W ARP) developed by Varian 
[1990], a money-metric utility function is 
derived and an efficiency index is calculated to 
determine the percentage difference between the 
observed cost of consumption and the optimum 
cost of consumption for each period of the 
sample. 
The empincal results provide evidence that 
the alloc<ative efficiency in consumption In the 
U. S. has improved only slightly in the aftermath 
of the wave of deregulations in the early 1980s. 
Our fIndings seem to be consistent with the 
predictions of the general theory of second best 
in showing that gains in the allocative efficiency 
may be minimal as long as many sectors remain 
partially or totally regulated. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. 
SectIOn II presents the theoretical framework for 
deriving the efficiency index following the 
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WARP. The application of the WARP to the 
analysis of the hypothesis of optimizing behav-
ior of the U.S. consumers and the empirical 
findings are discussed in Section III. The 
conclusion of this study is summarized in the 
final sectIon. 
II. Methodology 
Consider a consumption process by a con-
sumer that generates an observed set of data (Pi, 
X) for 1 = 1, ... , n, where pi is a vector of 
good prices and X is a vector of good demands 
Let the revealed preference relation of the 
consumer be presented by the notation >. If 
these data were generated by the utility-
maxImizing behavior of the consumer, It must 
satisfy the followlllg conditIOn: 
if EW, X) ::; E(PI, XI) (1) 
where EW, X) = pi XI is the cost of the 
observed consumption choice, and E(PI, Xl) = 
plXI IS the cost of any other consumptIOn choice. 
This critenon is known as the WARP. This 
condition is both necessary and suffIcient for 
utIlity-maximizing behavIOr. If a data set 
satisfIes the WARP. then it IS possIble to 
construct an expenditure functIOn that would 
generate the observed deCISIons as utility-
maximizing deciSIOns. Discussion on consis-
tency with utilIty maximIzation based on the 
WARP can be found in Afriat [1972], Akerlof 
and Yellen [1985], Diewert and Parkan [1985], 
and Varian [1985, 1990], among others. 
In the empIrical analysis of consistency WIth 
utIlIty minimization, one has to make the 
distmction between the conventional tests and 
the goodness-of-flt tests. The major critIcIsm of 
the conventIonal tests is that they are based on 
exact optimlzmg behavior. Hence the conven-
tional tests are exact tests in the sense that eIther 
the data pass the test exactly, or they don't If 
the data fail the test, the optImIzing hypothesis 
is rejected and the magllltude of the deviatIOn 
between observed and optImum choIces cannot 
be determined. On the other hand, nearly 
optimizing behavIor IS just as good as exact 
optImizing behavior III the sense that one only 
has to define a reasonable deVIation between 
optimum and observed choices to accept the 
hypotheSIS of nearly optimIzing behaVIOr [Aker-
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lof and Yellen, 1985: Cochrane, 1989, Varian, 
1984, 1985, 1990]. The notIon of nearly 
optimizing behavior IS the basis for the applIca-
tIOn of the goodness-of-flt tests as opposed to 
the conventional tests to mvestJgate the charac-
teristICS of exact optImizing behavior. 
An index of efficiency developed by Afriat 
[1972] and described m Varian [1990] IS used to 
derive a goodness-of-fit measure to examine 
utility-maximIzing behavIOr. If there is a 
violation of the WARP. then EW, X) > CW, 
Xl) for all Xl 2: X The relative measure of 
departure from utilIty maximization IS given by 
the effiCIency index, el, defined as 
el = 1 - EW, Xl)/ECPI. X) (2) 
The effiCiency index IS the percentage chfference 
between the cost of the observed consumptIon 
choice and the cost of any other consumption 
chOICe ThIS mdex IS a relatIve measure of how 
much the consumer could have saved If Xl rather 
than XI was purchased at price pl. If the value of 
the efficiency index is small. then it would be 
reasonable to consider the consumer a~ bemg a 
nearly utIlIty maXImIzer. A reduction m the 
value of the mdex is al50 an indication of an 
Improvement in the optimizmg behavior of the 
consumer. 
The fIrst step III applymg the goodness-of-flt 
measure i~ estImating the total cost of consump-
tion that would have been Incurred by the 
consumer, E(PI, Xl), had Xl rather than X been 
chosen based on meaningful optimizing prinCI-
ples. E(PI. XI) could then be compared WIth 
observed expenditure data. E(PI. X), to calcu-
late the effIciency mdex given In equation (2) 
As a procedure to estimate E(PI. XI), conSider 
the following generalized Cobb-Douglas utIlity 
function of a consumer. 
II 
u IT iI,. ~\, , I 1.. • • • " 11 (3) 
(= I 
where XI is the quantity consumption of good i 
and a l is the expenditure share of good I The 
demand functions consIstent WIth the conditions 
of the WARP in equation (I) and the utdity 
function in equation (3) are 
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X, = a,E (PI, Xl)/P,; i = 1, . . .. .. , n (4) 
where p, is the market price of good i To make 
the system of equation:- of good demands m 
equation (4) consistent, I.e., E(P'. XJ) = 2p,X" 
the restriction is imposed so that 2a, = 1 
To derive the explicit expression for the 
expenditure function E(P', XJ), the good de-
mands in equation (4) are substituted into 
equation (3) and solved for E(P', XJ). The 
resulting equation is: 
(5) 
Takmg the natural logarithm of both sides of 
equation (5), one gets. 
/) 
n n / 
- ~arLna, + ~a,Ln(P',X,) (6) 
r=\ 1=1 
Equation (6) is the explicit functional form of 
the expenditure function consistent with the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of utility-
maximizing behavior implied by the WARP. It 
is also noted that the natural logarithm of the 
actual expenditures by a consumer on all goods, 
LnE(P', X'), IS equal to the natural logarithm of 
the expenditure-minimizing amount, LnE(P', 
XJ), plus an error term, u, representing the 
optimization error. Using equation (6), one 
obtains: 
LnE (PI, X') LnE (PI, Xl) + u (7) 
or 
LnE (P', Xi) 
n 
+ ~ a,Ln(p,x,) + U (8) 
,~l 
To develop the goodness-of-fit test to examine 
consistency with utility-maximization, the param-
eters in equation (8) are estimated subject to the 
restriction that 2a, = 1. Once these estimates are 
Vol. 41, No.2 (Pall 1997) 
obtained, one can determine the expenditure of 
the consumption choice implied by the WARP, 
E(P', XJ), in equation (6), and then calculate the 
efficiency index, e', in equatIOn (2) to examine the 
optimizing behavior of consumers. The empirical 
results of the test of optimizing behavior of ag-
gregate consumption expenditures in the U.S. are 
presented in the sequel. 
III. Empirical Results 
In thiS section. the empirical results of the test 
of the hypothesis of optlmizmg behaVIOr of the 
U.S. consumers are discussed. First, the overall 
aggregate consumption behavior in the U.S. is 
examined by estimating equation (8) using 
quarterly and seasonally adjusted series in 1987 
dollars, taken from the Citibase, on real 
consumer expenditures on eight commodity 
categories: clothing, durable goods, energy, 
food, housing, medical care, transportation, and 
others for the penod of 1947:1 through 1993:1. 
Additionally, the estimation results are checked 
for both first-order and fourth-order autocorrela-
tion. Second, the sequential Chow test is 
performed to test for the occurrence of structural 
change m the aggregate consumption during the 
period of the study. Finally, the efficiency index 
is calculated for each period by estimating 
equation (8) and using equations (2) and (6) to 
determine the magnitude of the departure from 
cost-minimizing behavior in consumption. 
Descriptive statistics and defmition of the 
variables used in the study are listed in Table 1. 
The OLS estimate of equation (8) subject to the 
restrictIOn that 2a, = 1 is shown in Table 2.2 It 
IS noted that each of the coefficient estimates has 
the expected sign and is significant at the 5 
percent level. The estimated regression explains 
over 99 percent of the variation in the total 
consumption expenditures as is indicated by the 
adjusted R2 The estimated Durbin-Watson 
(OW) statistic of 0.413 indicate~ the presence of 
the positive first-order autocorrelation at any 
reasonable level of significance. 
Equation (8) is reestimated usmg the maxi-
mum-likelihood (ML) estimation technique for 
correction of the first-order autocorrelation. The 
results are reported in Table 3. 3 The results on 
the coefficient estimates have the expected sign 
and are sigmficant at the 5 percent level. The 
estimated OW statistic is 2 03, confirming the 
65 
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TABLE I 
Descnptlve Statistics for the Expenditure Function Vanables, U.S Economy, 
1947 I to 1993.1" 
Vanables 
Total ConsumptIOn Expenditures 
Clothing 
Durables 
Enelgy 
Food 
Housmg 
Medical Care 
Transportation 
Others 
a All the figures on the mean are III bllhons of dollars 
removal of the fIrst-order autocorrelation from 
the estimated regressIOn 
Given the sample period 'of 1947:1 to 1993:1, 
one would expect some structural mstability in 
the model coefficIents. In order to examine the 
stability of the model, a formal test for the 
structural stabIlIty of the model is performed 
based on the sequential Chow test [Green, 
1993]. The F-value for the Chow test is II .36 
obtained at the period of the first quarter of 
1985. The calculated statistic IS statistically 
SIgnificant at the 5 percent level, suggestmg that 
there indeed IS a structural change in 1985. 4 
Consequently, equation (8) is reestimated for 
each of the two sub-periods of 1947:1 to 1984:IV 
and 1985:1 to t 993:1 using the ML estimation 
technIque for correction of the first-order 
TABLE 2 
EstImated Consumption ExpendIture FunctIon 
Under the WARP; U S Economy, 
1947 I to 1993.1 
Standard 
Vanable Coefficient Error 
Clothmg o 160181 0.006477 
Durables 0084585 0.002604 
Energy 0.013448 0005252 
Food 0237149 0.010012 
Housmg 0.074260 0005306 
Medical Care o 116747 0.006339 
TramportatIOn 0.044930 0002968 
Others 0.257279 0007654 
Intercept 1.897710 0024134 
Adjusted R2 0.99 
D.W 0413 
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Mean 
1886.16 
98.03 
21658 
7441 
37834 
277 28 
20655 
73 19 
560.77 
SD 
80398 
4687 
11805 
18.72 
93.29 
132.00 
12664 
28.19 
24678 
autocorrelatIOn subject to the restnctlOn that la, 
= 1. The results are reported in Table 4, and are 
used to calculate the effICIency Illdex to examine 
the hypothesis of optimizing behavior of the 
U.S. consumers in each of the sub-periods as 
descnbed below. 
The last step is to empirically examme the 
fundamental question of whether the com.ump-
tlon behaVior in the US. over the penod of the 
study is consistent with the WARP explamed in 
Section II. The basis for this analysis IS the 
estimatIOn result of the expenditure functIOn in 
equation (8), reported in Table 4, and the 
calculation of the efficiency index in equation 
(2) 
Usmg the parameter estimates of the expendi-
TABLE 3 
Maxlmum-Llkelthood (ML) E~tlmate of the 
ExpendIture Function With CorrectIOn for the 
First-Order Autocorrelation Under the WARP. U S 
Economy: 1947.I to 1993.1 
Standard 
Variable CoeffICient Error 
C]othmg o ]50744 0007954 
Durables 0095698 0003216 
Energy 0032985 0004445 
Food 0220987 0007175 
Housmg 0098104 0.008731 
Medical Cale 0075228 0005603 
Transportation 0.040740 0.005346 
Others 0276072 0.009110 
Intercept 1 000402 0000136 
Adjusted R2 099 
OW. 203 
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TABLE 4 
Maximum-Llkehood (ML) Estimate of the ExpendIture FunctIOn wIth CorrectIOn for the FIrst-Order 
AutocorrelatIOn Under the WARP; U S. Economy; Sub-penods of 1947:1 to 1984:IV and 1985:1 to 1993:1 
Standard Standard 
CoefficIent Error CoefficIent Error 
Variable (1947:1 to 1984' IV) (1985.I to 1993'1) 
Clothlllg 
Durables 
Energy 
0.156677 0.008192 0.166100 
0.118729 
0.014947 
0.141736 
0.006569 
0.002776 
0003083 
0.004301 
0.009235 
0.006096 
0004486 
0004081 
6.27 X 10- 5 
0.088219 0.003381 
0.031145 0004530 
Food o 222969 0.006885 
Housing 
MedIcal Care 
Transportation 
Others 
Intercept 
o 104837 0009221 o 125985 
0.111851 
0022484 
0282888 
811XIO- s 
0.070845 0.005228 
0036254 0.005148 
0.275872 0.008651 
0.000213 0.000157 
Adjusted R2 
D.W. 
0.99 
1.78 
ture function in equation (8) in each sub-period 
of the study, reported in Table 4, and the result 
in equation (6), the cost-minimizing level of 
expenditures for consumption, E(P', XJ), is 
estimated. From these estimations and the 
observed consumption expenditure figures, 
E(P', X'), the efficiency index, e', in equation 
(2) is calculated. 
It should be emphasized that the calculated 
values of the efficiency index are positive for 
each time penod because the actual cost of 
consumption, E(P', X'), to purchase a given 
commodity basket must always be greater than 
the optImum cost of consumption, E(P', XJ), for 
purchasing the same commodity basket if there 
is a violation of the WARP. 
The calculated efficiency index for the fIrst 
quarter of selected years in each of the 
sub-periods of the study is reported in Table 5. 
According to these indices, U.S. consumers are 
fairly efficient for all years under study. For 
example, in 1947.1 the value of thIS index is 
0.99 
2.14 
0.10 indIcating that the actual consumption 
expenditures on all goods and services con-
sumed are fairly close to their optimal levels. 
The value of the coefficient rises to 0.28 in 
1984. I, indicating that the mefficiency in 
consumer expenditures triples over the three 
decades. ThIS could be a result of the introduc-
tion of more regulations and price and wage 
controls. However, the value of the index dips 
slightly in 1985.1 to 0.25 and remains constant 
at 0.27 from there on. This shows some minor 
gain in effICIency in consumer expenditures in 
the post 1985 era as opposed to the years prior to 
1985. 
It may be argued that the deregulation 
movements of tte early 1980s in the trucking, 
airline, and banking industries, among others, 
were coming to fruition by 1985. Therefore, 
freer markets are expected to reduce the cost of 
transportation of goods and services as well as 
financial services. The benefits of the deregula-
tIOn are reputed to be contagious across various 
TABLE 5 
Selected EstImated EffIcIency Index for Measurement of Departure from Expenditure Mllllmlzation III 
ConsumptIon Under the WARP, U S. Economy, Sub-periods of 1947:1 to 1984:IV and 1985'[ to 1993 I 
Sub-penod of 1947.1 to 1984:IV: 
19471 19501 19551 19601 19651 1970.1 1975.1 19801 1984.IV 
o 10 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28 0 28 0.28 0.28 
Sub-period of 1985:1 to 1993:1' 
1985.1 19901 to 1993:1' 
o 25 0.27 0.27 
Vol. 41, No.2 (Fall 1997) 
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sectors and throughout the economy by reducing 
the cost-push inflation. As proponents of 
deregulation have argued, III the end, consumers 
benefIt from the lower costs of good sand 
services and are able to allocate their resources 
more efficIently, thus, improving their welfare. 
IV. Conclusion 
The deregulation of various sector~ of the 
economy ccrtamly provides consumers an op-
portunIty to benefIt from choIces that the 
competItIve market offers. The relevant issue is 
whether consumers actually take advantage of 
the deregulation process. and strive to allocate 
their resources most efficiently. If on the 
demand-')Ide consumers are not allocatmg their 
scarce resources in accordance with the utility 
maximization paradigm, then the economy may 
not achieve maximum efficiency despite gains in 
productive efficiency. 
This paper analyzes the U.S. consumers' opti-
mizing behavior hypothesis for the period of 1947.I 
through 1993.1. The estimation results indicate that 
the U.S consumers are fairly efficient for all years 
under study. For the period of 1947.I to 1984.IV, 
the estimate of the consumption efficiency index, 
measuring the percentage difference between the 
cost of the observed consumption choice and the 
cost of the optimum consumption choice under 
WARP, ranges from 0.10 in 1947.I to 0.28 in 
1984.1Y. This finding indicates that the consumers 
were almost three times below their optimum con-
sumption expenditure in 1984 as compared to 
1947. This could be a result of the introduction of 
more regulations, e.g., transportation and banking, 
and price and wage controls. However, the value of 
the index declines slightly in 1985.I to 0.25 and 
remains constant at 0.27 for the remaining years till 
1993. This slight improvement in the consumers' 
efficiency after 1984.I may mark the beginning of 
the beneficiary effect of less regulation by the 
government. 
It may be argued that the potential deregulation 
movements benefits of the early 1980s in a number 
of key industries, e.g., the trucking, airlines, and 
banking industries, among others, were starting to 
materialize by 1985, resulting into reduced costs of 
transportation of goods and financial services. As 
proponents of deregulation have argued, in the end, 
consumers benefit from the lower costs of more 
68 
available baskets of goods and services and are 
able to allocate their resources more efficiently, 
thus, improving efficiency in consumption and 
their welfare. 
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Notes 
1. It is noted that under a current proposal by the 
Clinton Administration the Congress IS consider-
ing the elimination of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. 
2 SInce ItS constant term is non-linear, equation (8) 
IS estimated nonlinearly subject to the reqUIrement 
that ka j = 1. The results are, agaIn, Similar to 
those reported In Table 2 
3. The use of quarterly data In this paper warrants a 
concern over the fourth-order serIal correlation In 
the disturbance term of equation (8). ThiS 
possibility IS Investigated using the Lagrange 
MultiplIer (LM) test due to Breusch (1978) and 
Godfrey (1978). The calculated chi-square statis-
tic is 8 43. Based on the critical value of the 
chi-square statistic with 4 degrees of freedom at 
the 5 percent level of sigmficance of 9.49, the 
maintained hypotheSIS of no fourth-order senal 
correlation in the disturbance term of equatIOn (8) 
IS accepted. 
4. The finding of the structural change in the 
residuals of the estimation results reported in 
Table 3 IS also checked using a cusum square 
(CUSUMS) test of the residuals. With a 95 
percent confidence bond, the CUSUMS test of the 
reSiduals confirms the finding that there is a 
structural change In the period of the study at the 
first quarter of 1985. 
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